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Abstract
Endogenous sharing rules was introduced by Simon and Zame [15] to model payoff in-
determinacy in discontinuous games. Their main result concerns the existence of a solution,
i.e., a mixed Nash equilibrium and an associated sharing rule. This note extends their result
to abstract economies [1] where, by definition, players are restricted to pure strategies, and
provide an interpretation of Simon and Zame’s model in terms of preference incompleteness.
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1 Introduction
The model of games with endogenous sharing rules was introduced by Simon and Zame
[15]. Formally, it is a (N + 1)-tuple G = ((Xi)i∈N ,U), where Xi is the strategy set1 of
player i ∈ N , and U is a multivalued function from X :=∏i∈N Xi to RN with nonempty
values. The set U(x) ⊂ RN can be interpreted as the universe of payoff possibilities, given
the strategy profile x ∈ X. When U(x) = {(ui(x))i∈N} is a singleton for every x ∈ X,
G reduces to a standard strategic game, ui being the payoff function of player i. Simon
and Zame [15] provide conditions that guarantee the existence of a solution for G, i.e.,
existence of a selection u = (ui)i∈N of U (a sharing rule of U), together with a mixed
Nash equilibrium of the game G = ((Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N).
The concept of sharing rules gives rise to many interpretations. Imagine a designer
who must determine who wins an indivisible object in some auction including tie-breaking
rules. In that case, selections of U represent admissible auction rules, and a solution can
be seen as a mechanism and a Nash equilibrium of the induced game. Another motivation
comes from the payoff indeterminacy that many economic models exhibit: for example,
several producers have to choose, each, a location in an area where a continuum of con-
sumers are uniformly distributed. Assume each consumer goes to the closest location.
Then payoffs are not well defined when some producers choose the same location: indeed,
any division of consumers between the producers is plausible. Simon and Zame’s result
guarantees the existence of a market sharing rule under which the discontinuous game
played by the producers admits a mixed Nash equilibrium.
In this note, we prove existence of a Simon and Zame “solution” in abstract economies.
This is an equilibrium model, introduced by Arrow and Debreu [1], in which the strategies
of a player are constrained by the strategies of his opponents. For example, in exchange
economies, consumers are limited by their budget constraint, which depends on the price
vector, itself depending on consumers’ demands. Observe that mixed equilibria are not
relevant in this context: if consumers choose random consumption bundles, then equality
1For simplicity, we use the same letter N for the set of players or the number of players.
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of supply and demand is, in general, not compatible with the independence of players’
strategies.
Our second contribution is an interpretation of sharing rules indeterminacy in terms
of preference incompleteness. As Aumann [2] argues: “of all axioms of utility theory,
the completeness axiom is perhaps the most questionable”. Following this seminal paper,
many extensions of equilibrium models to incomplete preferences have been investigated,
either for continuous preferences [8, 13], or discontinuous ones [5, 12, 16]. In this note,
we will assume that the ambiguity generated by the indeterminacy of payoffs creates
incompleteness in the preferences. This permits to associate to every abstract economy
with endogenous sharing rules an abstract economy with incomplete and discontinuous
preferences. We prove that, in general, this economy does not possess a Nash equilibrium,
but it is possible to complete the preferences in a weak sense to restore the existence of
an equilibrium.
2 Abstract Economies with Endogenous Sharing Rules
An abstract economy with endogenous sharing rules E is a couple E = (G,B = (Bi)i∈N)
where G = ((Xi)i∈N ,U) is a game with endogenous sharing rules, and Bi is a multival-
ued mapping from X−i to Xi with a closed graph and nonempty convex values (i.e., a
Kakutani-type mapping).
Definition 1 A solution of E is a couple (x, u), where u = (ui)i∈N is a selection of U ,
and x ∈ X is a generalized Nash equilibrium of ((Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ,B), i.e.:
(i) For every i ∈ N , xi ∈ Bi(x−i).
(ii) For every di ∈ Bi(x−i), ui(di, x−i) ≤ ui(x).
Consider the following assumptions:
A1: X is a convex and compact subset of a Hausdorff and locally convex topological
vector space;
2
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.58
A2: U is bounded;
A3: The graph of E , defined by Γ := {(x, v) : v ∈ U(x) and xi ∈ Bi(x−i) for every i ∈ N},
is closed;
A4: U admits a selection u = (ui)i∈N , such that each ui is quasiconcave in player i’s
strategy.
Remark 2 Simon and Zame proved existence of a solution in mixed strategies in strategic
games under A1, A2, A3 and convexity of U(x) for every x ∈ X.
Theorem 3 Any abstract economy with endogenous sharing rules satisfying A1 to A4
admits a solution2.
3 Applications
3.1 Incomplete Preferences
Let us give an interpretation of Theorem 3 in terms of incomplete preferences. If G =
((Xi)i∈N ,U) is a game with endogenous sharing rules, then we can define the following
preorders3 on X.
Definition 4 We say that y ∈ X is U-preferable to x ∈ X for player i, denoted x .i y,
if and only if ui(x) ≤ ui(y) for every selection4 u of U .
When x and y are distinct, x .i y is equivalent to supUi(x) ≤ inf Ui(y), where Ui(x)
denotes the projection of U(x) ⊂ RN on the i-th component. In short, x .i y if and
2When Bi(x−i) = Xi for every x−i ∈ X−i and every i ∈ I, we get the existence of a solution a` la
Simon-Zame in pure strategies. This was an open question in Jackson et al. [9] and was solved recently
in Bich and Laraki [4].
3A preorder is a reflexive and transitive binary relation.
4Every preorder . on X admits a multi-utility representation (see [10]), that is there exists a family
(vj)j∈J of real-valued functions defined on X such that: x . y ⇔ for every j ∈ J , vj(x) ≤ vj(y). Thus,
there is no loss of generality in working with a cardinal multi-representation.
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only if y is at least as good as x, whatever the indeterminacy of payoffs modelized by U .
Formally, to every abstract economy (G, (Bi)i∈N), one can associate an abstract economy
with incomplete preferences E = ((Xi)i∈N , (.i)i∈N , (Bi)i∈N), where the preorders .i are
derived from U as described above.
It is then standard to define a generalized Nash equilibrium of E as a profile x ∈
Πi∈NBi(x−i) such that there is no player i ∈ N and no deviation yi ∈ Bi(x−i) with5
x i (yi, x−i). The following example proves that, in general, E fails to have a generalized
Nash equilibrium, even if the initial game G satisfies assumptions A1 to A4.
Example 5 Consider a strategic game with endogenous sharing rules and two players.
The strategy spaces are X1 = X2 = [0, 1]. The endogenous sharing rules are defined
by U(x1, x2) = (1 − x1(1 − x2), 1 − (1 − x1 − x2)2) if (x1, x2) 6= (0, 1) and U(0, 1) =
{(−1, 1), (1, 1)}. This satisfies assumption A1 to A4. In particular, any selection u of U
satisfies the quasiconcavity requirement A4. As described above, this defines a game with
incomplete preferences E = ((Xi)i=1,2, (.i)i=1,2). Clearly, for player 2, the unique best-
response to x1 is x2 = 1− x1. Thus, for every x1 > 0, (x1, x2) is not a Nash equilibrium
of E, since it would imply x2 = 1− x1 < 1, but then the only best-response of player 1 is
x1 = 0, a contradiction. Thus, the only candidate to be a Nash equilibrium is (0, 1), but it
is not, since (0, 1) 1 (ε, 1) for every ε ∈]0, 1]. Indeed, 1 = supU1(0, 1) ≤ inf U1(ε, 1) = 1
and 1 = supU1(ε, 1) > inf U1(0, 1) = −1. Hence, E has no Nash equilibria. In particular,
it is not generalized correspondence secure (see [7]), a condition that would imply the
existence of a Nash equilibrium of E.
Thus, one cannot apply recent generalized Nash existence results to E (e.g., Yannelis,
He [16] or Carmona and Podzeck [7]) simply because the game may fail to have a Nash
equilibrium. We now study the possibility of restoring existence after some completion of
the preferences. Recall that a completion of the preorder .i defined on X is a total order
.′i on X such that:
5Here, i denotes the strict preorder associated to .i, that is: for every (x, y) ∈ X2, x i y if and
only if x .i y and not (y .i x).
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(i) ∀(x, y) ∈ X2, x .i y ⇒ x .′i y;
(ii) ∀(x, y) ∈ X2, x i y ⇒ x ′i y.
When the preorders .i, i ∈ N , are defined from U as above, then for every selection
u of U , one can define a u-completion of .i as the total order .ui on X such that:
x .ui y ⇔ ui(x) ≤ ui(y). This is a weak completion of .i, in the sense that it satisfies
property (i) but not property (ii). This is because x i y is defined by: vi(x) ≤ vi(y) for
every selection v of U , and wi(x) < wi(y) for at least one selection of U , and this may not
imply6 ui(x) < ui(y).
Corollary 6 Consider an abstract economy with endogenous sharing rule (G, (Bi)i∈N)
which satisfies assumptions A1 to A4, and let .i be the preorders associated to U as
described above. Then there exists u-completions .ui of the preorders .i (i ∈ N) for some
selection u of U , such that ((Xi)i∈N , (.ui )i∈N , (Bi)i∈N) has a generalized Nash equilibrium
x¯ ∈ X.
3.2 Discontinuous Abstract Economies
To every discontinuous abstract economy, we can associate endogenous sharing rules, and
thus incomplete preferences, to which we can apply Theorem 3. Indeed, consider an
6To avoid this problem, we could strengthen the definition of the preorders i as follows: say that
y ∈ X is U-strongly preferable to x ∈ X for player i, denoted x i y, if and only if ui(x) < ui(y)
for every selection u of U . This leads to a more restrictive notion of profitable deviation, thus to a
weaker notion of Nash equilibrium. Under assumptions A1 to A4, the existence of a Nash equilibrium
is a direct consequence of Shafer-Sonnenschein’s Theorem (see [14]). Indeed, denote by Pi(x) the set
of strategies of player i strictly preferred to xi given the strategies of the other players. If yi ∈ Pi(x),
then supUi(x) < inf Ui(yi, x−i). Since U has a closed graph, we get supUi(x′) < inf Ui(y′i, x′−i), that is
x′  (y′i, x′−i), for every (x′, y′i) in some neighborhood of (x, yi). This proves that Pi has an open graph.
Moreover, xi /∈ coPi(x) for every i ∈ I. Indeed, otherwise, xi is in the convex hull of a finite family of
strategies (xi(k))
K
k=1 with xi(k) ∈ Pi(x), that is, ui(xi(k), x−i) > ui(x) for every selection u of U . In
particular, no selection u of U can be quasiconcave with respect to xi, which contradicts assumption A4.
Consequently, we can apply Shafer-Sonnenschein’s Theorem to get the existence of a Nash equilibrium
in the game defined by the preorders i.
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abstract economy (G = ((Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N),B) with bounded payoff functions ui, quasicon-
cave with respect to xi for all i ∈ N . For every profile y ∈ X, define U(y) to be the set
of limits of (u(yn))n∈IN for all possible sequences (yn)n∈IN converging to y and such that
yni ∈ Bi(yn−i) for all i ∈ N . Following the previous subsection, a strategy profile y ∈ X
is U -preferable to another strategy profile x ∈ X for player i if ui(x) ≤ ui(y) for every
selection u of U : in short, it means that player i prefers y to x, even after some small
modifications of the strategy profiles x and y. Example 5 proves that these incomplete
preferences are too restrictive to permit the existence of a generalized Nash equilibrium.
But, from Corollary 6 (and since U satisfies all the assumptions A1 to A4), there is a
q-completion of these preferences for which the new economy (G′ = ((Xi)i∈N , (qi)i∈N),B)
has a generalized Nash equilibrium. Formally, q satisfies: for every y ∈ X, there is a
sequence (yn)n∈IN converging to y such that yni ∈ Bi(yn−i) for every i ∈ N and such that
q(y) = limn→+∞ u(yn). This extends Theorem 2 in [4].
3.3 Exchange Economies
Theorem 3 can be applied to exchange economies as follows. Consider n consumers and
m commodities. Consumer i’s consumption set Xi is a nonempty convex and compact
subset of Rm+ . The initial endowment ei of consumer i is assumed to be in the interior of
Xi. Following the interpretation of subsection 3.1, consumer’s incomplete preferences are
assumed to be represented by a multivalued function7 Ui from Xi to R+ with a closed
graph, nonempty bounded values and a quasiconcave selection8. Under these assumptions,
theorem 3 implies that there exists9 a selection ui of Ui (i ∈ N) such that the economy
{Xi, ui, ei}i∈N admits a Walrasian equilibrium (x, p) ∈ Πi∈NXi ×∆(Rm+ ), that is
7Here, to simply the exposition, we do not allow externalities, that is Ui depends only of player i’s
strategies.
8For example, let us assume that for every i ∈ N , for every vi ∈ Ui(x), where x is the convex
combination of a finite number of points x1, ..., xK of X, there is uk ∈ Ui(xk) (k = 1, ...,K) such that
v ≥ min{u1, ..., uK}. Then, each ui(x) = minUi(x) defines a selection of Ui, and ui is quasiconcave in
player i’s strategy.
9In the theorem, ∆(Rm+ ) denotes the unit simplex of R
m
+ .
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(1)
∑
i∈N xi =
∑
i∈N ei, and
(2) xi maximizes the utility function ui of agent i on his budget set Bi(p) = {y ∈ Xi :
p · (yi − ei) ≤ 0}.
The proof is as follows. Consider the following (N + 1)-player abstract economy with
endogenous sharing rules: for i = 1, ..., N , player i’s strategy space is Xi. The strategy
space of player (N + 1) (called the auctioneer) is XN+1 = ∆(R
m
+ ), and his payoff function
is vN+1(x, p) = p.
∑
i∈N(xi − ei). The payoff correspondence is defined by V(x, p) =∏
i∈N Ui(xi)× {vN+1(x, p)}. Last for every i ∈ N , Bi(x−i, p) = {xi ∈ Xi : p · xi ≤ p · ei},
and finally BN+1(x−i, p) = XN+1. This defines an abstract economy (G,B). From Theorem
3, it has a solution (x, p, u). By definition of a solution, (x, p) is a Walrasian equilibrium
of {Xi, ui, ei}i∈N .
4 Appendix: Proof of Theorem 3
By assumption, U admits a single-valued selection v = (vi)i∈I where each vi is quasiconcave
in player i’s strategy. Following an idea of Reny [11], we associate to the abstract economy
(G = ((Xi)i∈N , v),B) a strategic game G′ as follows. Because U is bounded, there exists Λ ∈ IR
such that vi(x) ≥ Λ + 1 for every i ∈ N and every profile x ∈ X. The game G′ has N players.
For every i ∈ N , strategy set of player i is Xi, and his payoff is
ui(x) =
 vi(x) if xi ∈ Bi(x−i),Λ otherwise.
The proof of Theorem 3 rests on the claim below. Throughout this proof, for every i ∈ N ,
x ∈ X, and U in V(x−i) (the set of open subsets of X−i), denote by WU (xi, x−i) the set of
Kakutani-type10 multivalued mappings di from U to Xi such that xi ∈ di(x−i). Let ui : X → R
be the following regularization11 of the utility function ui
(1) ui(x) := supU∈V(x−i) supdi∈WU (x) infx′−i∈U,x′i∈di(x′−i) ui(x
′).
10A Kakutani-type multivalued mapping is a multivalued mapping with nonempty convex values and
a closed graph.
11This function was introduced by Carmona (see [6]).
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Remark that ui(x) ≤ ui(x) for every x ∈ X, since in the infimum above one can take x′ = x.
Claim. There exists some new payoff functions (qi)i∈I and a pure Nash equilibrium x ∈ X of
G′′ = ((Xi)i∈N , (qi)i∈N ), with the additional properties:
(i) for every i and di ∈ Xi, qi(di, x−i) ≥ ui(di, x−i).
(ii) For every i ∈ N and every y ∈ X, there exists some sequence (yn) converging to y such that
u(yn) converges to q(y).
Proof of the Claim. Let Γ := {(x, u(x)) : x ∈ X}. Recall that G′ is generalized better-reply
secure (Barelli and Meneghel [3]) if whenever (x, v) ∈ Γ and x is not a Nash equilibrium, there
exists a player i and a triple (φi, Vx, αi), where Vx is an open neighborhood of x, φi is a Kakutani-
type multivalued function from Vx to Xi and αi > ui is a real, such that for every x
′ in Vx such
that x′i ∈ φi(x′), one has ui(x′i, x′−i) ≥ αi.
Let us prove that there exists a couple (x, v) ∈ Γ such that:
(2) ∀i ∈ N, sup
di∈Xi
ui(di, x−i) ≤ vi.
When u is continuous, this implies (x, v) = (x, u(x)), and it is simply the definition
of a Nash equilibrium. By contradiction, assume that there is no such couple, and let us
prove that G′ is generalized better-reply secure. For, consider (x, v) ∈ Γ such that x is not
a Nash equilibrium. By assumption, (x, v) does not satisfy Equation 2, thus there exists
some player i ∈ N such that supdi∈Xi ui(di, x−i) > vi. From the definition of ui, there is
ε > 0, U ∈ V(x−i), φi ∈ WU(x) such that for every x′−i ∈ U and every x′i ∈ φi(x′−i),
ui(x
′
i, x
′
−i) ≥ vi + ε : this implies generalized better-reply security. Consequently, from
Barelli and Meneghel [3], since G′ is generalized better-reply secure, it admits a Nash
equilibrium. But this is a contradiction, since if x ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium, (x, u(x))
satisfies Equation 2 (because ui(x) ≤ ui(x) for every x ∈ X). This proves the existence
of (x, v) ∈ Γ satisfying Equation 2.
Now, for every i ∈ N , denote by Si(x) the space of sequences (xn)n∈N of X converging
8
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to x such that limn→+∞ ui(xn) = ui(x). Then, define q : X → RN by
q(y) =

v if y = x,
any limit point of u(xn)n∈N if y = (di, x−i) for some i ∈ N, di 6= xi, (xn)n∈N ∈ Si(di, x−i),
q(y) = u(y) otherwise.
Since (x, v) ∈ Γ, and by definition of q, condition (ii) of the claim above is satisfied
at x. Clearly, by definition, it is also satisfied at every y different from x for at least two
components, and finally also at every (di, x−i) with di 6= xi (for some i ∈ N), from the
definition of q(di, x−i) in this case. Condition (i) is true at x or at every y different from
x for at least two components (from ui ≤ ui), is true at every (di, x−i) with di 6= xi by
definition, and is finally true at x from Equation 2. This ends the proof of the claim.
Now, we finish the proof of Theorem 3. Take di ∈ Bi(x−i) 6= ∅. For every x′−i in some
neighborhood of x−i and every x′i ∈ Bi(x′−i),, we have ui(x′i, x′−i) = vi(x′i, x′−i) ≥ Λ + 1.
since Bi is a Kakutani-type mapping, this implies, by definition, vi(di, x−i) ≥ Λ+1. Thus,
from condition (i) of the claim, we get
(3) ∀di ∈ Bi(x−i), qi(di, x−i) ≥ vi(di, x−i) ≥ Λ + 1
Since x is a Nash equilibrium of G′′, we have:
∀i ∈ N, qi(x) ≥ sup
di∈Xi
qi(di, x−i) ≥ Λ + 1.
From condition (ii) of the claim, there is a sequence (xn) converging to x such that
u(xn) converges to q(x). Since qi(x) ≥ Λ + 1 for every i ∈ N , we cannot have ui(xn) = Λ
for n large enough. Consequently, ui(x
n) = vi(x
n) and xni ∈ Bi(xn−i) for n large enough.
Passing to the limit, we get xi ∈ Bi(x−i) for every i ∈ I (because Bi has a closed graph),
and also vi(x) = ui(x) (from the definition of vi). A similar argument can be applied
to any (yi, x−i) ∈ X for which yi ∈ Bi(x−i): there is a sequence (xn) converging to
(yi, x−i) such that u(xn) converges to q(yi, x−i). Since qi(yi, x−i) ≥ Λ + 1 (from Equation
3), we cannot have ui(x
n) = Λ for n large enough. Consequently, ui(x
n) = vi(x
n) and
xni ∈ Bi(xn−i) for n large enough. In particular, since v is a selection of U and since U has
9
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a closed graph, we get
(4) ∀yi ∈ Bi(x−i), q(yi, x−i) ∈ U(yi, x−i).
Now, define q˜(yi, x−i) = q(yi, x−i) whenever yi ∈ Bi(x−i) for some i ∈ N , and q˜(y) = v(y)
elsewhere. The proof that x is a equilibrium of ((Xi)i∈N , (q˜i)i∈N , B) is straightforward.
Last, we have to prove that q˜(y) ∈ U(y) for every y ∈ X. This is clear at y = (yi, x−i)
for yi ∈ Bi(x−i), because of Equation 4. Otherwise, q˜(y) = v(y) ∈ U(y) by definition of
v. This ends the proof of Theorem 3.
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